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Abstract
This article explores links between discourses  
of masculinity and criminality in the narratives of 
non-criminal Russian men. Based on the analysis 
of biographical interviews with Russian men 
residing in Samara, this study examines different 
ways in which some of these men draw on criminal 
ideology or street lads’ hierarchies to construct 
their masculine identities and reveals the complex 
relations between masculinity, homosexuality  
and criminality in the post-Soviet Russian context. 
My data and personal life experience in Russia  
both suggest that appropriation of criminal or  
semi-criminal discourse as a resource for making 
masculinity among my respondents is not 
accidental and cannot be explained solely by 
their class and sociocultural backgrounds. I argue 
that contemporary masculinities in Russia are not 
only informed by criminal quasi-law (poniatiia) 
and rather similar ‘lads’ rules’ (patsanskie pravila), 
but are also in a state of complex power relations 
with criminal values and hierarchies. This article 
demonstrates that acceptance and internalization 
of criminal culture norms in the post-Soviet context 
acquired a disciplinary character, and allows for the 
construction of hegemonic masculinity – a specific 
type of masculinity, which legitimates hierarchical 
gender relations. 
Keywords: hegemonic masculinity, post-Soviet 
Russia, criminal and street masculine hierarchies, 
homophobia.
The Russian prison system is a very rigid 
hierarchical social structure that imposes an 
indelible imprint on its inmates. As the specialists 
working on prison reform in Russia have explained, 
a person who has spent three or four years in 
prison in this part of the world is never the same 
person again (Abramkin, Al’pern, 2005). Oleg had 
spent six years in prison and so his use of terms 
of reference taken from prison culture comes as 
no surprise. However the cases of eight other 
respondents, who have never been imprisoned 
and presumably have never had serious problems 
with the law, but still relied on the criminal quasi-
law or poniatiia and rather similar ‘lads’ rules’ or 
patsanskie pravila in their articulation of masculinity, 
require special consideration. It is especially 
curious that these men only drew on the discourse 
of criminality when they talked about masculinity 
or homosexuality, while the other parts of their 
biographical narratives were almost always 
completely free of criminal language and norms.
Some of these criminal articulations of masculinity 
tended to idealize criminals, their rigid code of 
conduct, relied heavily on prison jargon, and in 
general aimed to demonstrate that a speaker 
wished to be seen as a respected insider of 
the criminal men’s world. Others referred to 
the generalized character of the criminal lord, 
the members of street territorial gangs, and 
protagonists in Russian movies about bandits in 
order to ridicule, challenge, or at least disagree with 
their type of masculine bravado. It is interesting 
that even those men who specifically contrasted 
themselves to “this kind of man” still paid 
considerable attention to speculations about the 
criminal world. 
Drawing on in-depth biographical interviews with 
20 Russian men living in Samara and interviewed in 
2013, I focus on the narratives of eight individuals 
to explore the links between discourses of 
masculinity and criminality in the narratives of non-
criminal Russian men today. The fact that eight 
non-criminal interviewees spontaneously raised the 
topic of the criminal world supports the conclusions 
of some Russian researchers about the prevalence 
of prison values amongst all layers of contemporary 
Russian society (Oleinik, 2001a, 2001b, 2003; 
Taibakov, 2001; Khanipov, 2008). 
Criminological scholarship, however, ignores the 
gender dimension of the topic. At the same time, 
studies on men and masculinities in the Russian 
context have overlooked how the broader ideologies 
of masculinity and criminality intersect. The notable 
exceptions here are the works of sociologists 
researching youth cultures and delinquent gangs 
in post-Soviet Russia (Gromov, 2013; Gromov and 
Stephenson, 2008; Kosterina, 2006; Pilkington, 
Omel’chenko and Garifzianova, 2010; Salagaev, 2001; 
Salagaev and Shashkin, 2002, 2003, 2005; Shashkin 
and Salagaev, 2002; Stephenson, 2009, 2011, 2012). 
Whereas this literature shows that territorial gangs 
and street lads’ groups emulate prison and criminal 
culture’s gender ideals and the romantic brotherhood 
of outlaws, my research analyses the complex 
relations between masculinity, homosexuality  
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and criminality in the broader post-Soviet Russian 
context. My data shows that poniatiia and patsanskie 
pravila are important in the formation of masculinity 
even to men who are not steeped in this culture.
I argue that post-Soviet Russian masculinities are not 
only informed by criminal quasi-law and “lads” rules, 
but are also in a state of complex power relations 
with criminal values and hierarchies. Although 
not a representative sample, the interviews with 
non-criminal men in this study demonstrate that 
the positive or negative referencing to the criminal 
culture norms is an important resource for making 
masculinities in the post-Soviet context. The data also 
clearly demonstrates how the ideology of the criminal 
world legitimizes highly structured and hierarchical 
gender order in Russia. While consideration of this 
issue and a gender sensitive approach in criminology 
is almost totally absent from the Russian academic 
tradition, present study aims to fill this gap and 
contribute to our understanding of the interplay 
between masculinity and criminality in Russia. 
Hegemonic Masculinity and Criminality
“What is “masculinity”? Although we seem to have 
a difficult time defining masculinity, as a society 
we have little trouble in recognizing it, and indeed 
we spend massive amounts of time and money 
ratifying and supporting the versions of masculinity 
that we enjoy and trust” (Halberstam, 1998:1). 
As Jack Halberstam rightly notes, defining 
masculinity is never an easy task for researchers 
and analysts. I approach masculinity as a socially 
constructed category and a strategy, rather than 
as a somehow “natural” or psychological set of 
individual traits and characteristics. Masculinity is 
a configuration of practices and discourses that 
symbolise what it means to be a man in a given 
culture at a given historical period. “[T]he concept 
is also inherently relational. ‘Masculinity’ does not 
exist except in contrast with ‘femininity’” (Connell, 
1995: 68). People are socialised into a collective 
understanding of what masculinity and femininity 
mean and at the same time can actively challenge 
and transform conventional gender representations. 
Individuals are positioned differently within socially 
organised power relations and possess different 
social statuses on the basis of class, race and 
sexual orientation. International research confirms 
the initial insights of Connell that we can only talk 
about masculinity in plural terms and that “certain 
masculinities are more socially central, or more 
associated with authority and power, than others” 
(Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 846). In any 
given society there is a hierarchy of masculine 
behaviours and at the same time there is a specific 
form of masculinity that “structures and legitimates 
hierarchical gender relations between men and 
women, between masculinity and femininity, and 
among men” (Messerschmidt, 2012: 58). This is 
known as hegemonic masculinity. Connell and 
Messerschmidt stress that hegemonic masculinity 
is not fixed and is not necessarily the type of 
masculinity that is dominant at a particular time and 
place. This masculinity is not the most culturally 
celebrated or the most common in particular 
settings, but the one that legitimates a culturally 
and historically specific kind of gender inequality 
and hierarchies between men and between men 
and women (Messerschmidt, 2012). For this reason 
hegemonic masculinity may only be understood in 
its relationship to femininities and nonhegemonic 
masculinities. The types of practices and discourses 
that are considered to be hegemonically masculine 
differ according to historical context, geographic 
location and cultural setting (Connell, 1995). 
The concept of hegemonic masculinity, “originally 
formulated to conceptualize how patriarchal 
relations are legitimated throughout society,” 
(Messerschmidt, 2012: 63) has influenced gender 
studies across many academic fields. It has been 
embraced by many different disciplines, including 
criminology, a discipline that since the early 1990s 
has been “seeking to engage with the sexed 
specificity of its object of study–the fact that crime 
is, overwhelmingly, an activity engaged in by men” 
(Collier, 1998: viii). The recognition in the last few 
decades “that [crime] is almost always committed 
by men” (Newburn and Stanko, 1994: 10 in Collier, 
1998: 1) and that “[m]en predominate not just as 
officially ‘known’ (and unknown) offenders but 
also as workers within the criminal justice system” 
(Collier, 1998: 2) has made criminologists in some 
countries take masculinity seriously and focus their 
attention on how men, masculinities, and crime 
interact (Carlen and Jefferson, 1996; Collier, 1998; 
Messerschmidt, 1993, 2005; Newburn and Stanko, 
1994; Sabo, Kupers and London, 2001). 
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Although there is a certain degree of disagreement 
within criminology about the ability of hegemonic 
masculinity as an analytical category to 
comprehensively address such a complex subject 
as crime (Collier, 1998), a number of prominent 
researchers argue that involvement in crime may 
and should be seen as a resource in accomplishing 
or “doing” masculinity (Messrschmidt, 1993, 2005; 
Newburn and Stanko, 1994). As Messerschmidt 
has argued, “one crucial way… to understand 
‘making of crime’ by men is to analyse ‘the making 
of masculinities’“ (2005: 198). 
Methodology 
My fieldwork was conducted in Samara, the 
administrative centre of Samara Oblast in the Volga 
Federal District. Samara is approximately 1,100 
kilometres southeast of Moscow, with a population 
of 1,164,685 recorded in the 2010 census. Using 
purposive sampling procedure I collected the life 
stories of 20 individuals living there and identifying 
as men in order to explore the relationship between 
the ideology of manhood and subjective experience 
of being a man. I aimed to interview participants 
who were as different in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics as possible. For instance, if I had 
already interviewed an 18-year-old university student 
or a 68-year-old retired colonel, I would not contact 
other people with similar characteristics. 
All the interviews for this project were conducted 
in Russian, voice recorded with the informant’s 
permission, and ranged from two to five hours 
and most spanned more than one meeting. Along 
with the questions relating to an individual life 
story, I directly asked each of my informants if they 
considered themselves a man, and followed this 
inquiry with a set of questions about their ideas of 
masculinity. For instance, I asked them to explain 
in their own words how they understood the 
expression ‘to be a man’, who taught them to be  
a man, if they saw any privileges in being a man,  
if they had encountered any difficulties in becoming 
or being a man, and what the main challenges of 
being a man in today’s world are.
In the following two sections, I explore the notions 
of the criminal quasi-law (poniatiia) and lads’ rules 
(patsanskie pravila) in order to understand how 
my respondents used these systems of norms to 
narrate and represent their masculine identities in 
the interviews. I also explain why, for the purpose  
of this study, I draw direct parallels between 
“criminal” and “street” honour codes as well as 
between two different types of criminal ideology in 
Russia: one being “thieves” and the other “bandits”.
Poniatiia, Criminal Quasi-Law 
  Any Russian, even one who has never been in contact 
with detention facilities, is familiar with prison and criminal 
subculture. They would have encountered it while reading 
literary works, listening to pop songs, speaking argot, 
reproducing modes of behaviour that came into being  
in prison. (Oleinik, 2001b: 40).
The criminal quasi-law or poniatiia that I refer 
to throughout this article is an umbrella term for 
various codes of conduct including those that 
work in lawful contexts. It is extremely difficult to 
define and to comprehensively describe. Different 
social groups and networks in Imperial, Soviet 
and then post-Soviet Russia each had their own 
interpretations of poniatiia as well as different levels 
of commitment to its rules. Another key difficulty 
facing anyone who wants to research poniatiia 
in Russia is that the object of study is extremely 
volatile even inside a particular network. Although 
it is possible to get an idea about this set of norms 
and values while studying multiple cases of their 
usage, it turns out that these rules are ambiguous 
and their implementation depends on many factors, 
including the eloquence, authority, or physical 
strength of the person defending their version  
of such norms (Chalidze, 1977).
Certain Russian criminologists regard the 
Soviet prison subculture and so called “thieves’ 
law” (vorovskoi zakon) of the 1930s as one of 
the sources of contemporary criminal quasi-
law (Dolgova & Djakov, 1989: 109), but these 
hypotheses have never been verified (Oleinik, 
2003: 3). Contemporary criminal quasi-law can 
be understood as an unwritten code of norms 
and rules that regulates the relationships between 
prisoners, professional criminals and with the 
outside world. It is generally characterized by a 
strict hierarchical separation of men, disrespect 
towards formal social institutions and a culture of 
mutual trust and support within internal networks.1  
Another pillar of the Russian underworld is an 
ideological exclusion of women from criminal men’s 
fraternities. Poniatia are recognised, supported, 
and shared among the overwhelming majority 
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of prisoners and professional criminals. It is 
considered to be both an ethical imperative and  
a means of resistance to prison administrations  
as well as to the wider institutional order.
In popular conception, poniatiia are directly 
connected with prison and the world of thieves 
(vorovskoi mir). The term ‘thief’ (vor) in the context 
of Russian prison refers not to the common usage 
of this word (somebody who steals other people’s 
property) but to an elite group of leaders of the 
criminal and prison world. The thieves follow their 
own law, which has initiation and exclusion rituals, 
prescribes what is right and wrong, and what is and 
is not acceptable. Although there are some variations 
in the rules of the thieves’ world, its basic principles 
include an uncompromising attitude towards 
denunciation, the primacy of collective interest  
over private, brotherhood between prisoners,  
and providing help to those who find themselves  
in a difficult situation. In the thieves’ understanding, 
poniatiia dictates that one lives and acts according  
to one’s conscience, not the state’s laws.
As Volkov convincingly demonstrates, in the 1990s 
“the world of thieves has been challenged by a 
new type of criminal structure – the world of so-
called ‘bandits’” (Konstantinov & Dikselyus, 1998 
in Volkov, 1999: 744). A bandit is a member of a 
criminal group specializing in the use of violence 
(Volkov, 2002: 195). In contrast to thieves, who 
strive to keep a low profile and whose main “task 
is to steal (in a broad sense) and avoid being 
caught”, bandits are highly socially visible and 
claim the ability “to apply and manage organised 
force” as well as “to effect business transactions” 
(1999:744). Volkov describes the ideologies of 
these two social groups as follows: “The ethics of 
thieves is a projection of values and rules of prison 
life into civic (‘free’) life. Prison and labour camp 
terms are the major source of thieves’ authority, 
respect and career advancement to the highest title 
of thief-in-law. The bandit’s reputation and his rise 
to the elite position of avtoritet (authority) is build 
on precedents of vigorous and successful use or 
management of violence” (1999: 745). The bandits’ 
power rests on coercive capacity and is a kind 
of “political power” (Poggi, 1990: 1-18 in Volkov, 
2002: 60), while “[t]he power of thieves is much 
more dependent on moral authority and tradition; it 
is an example of normative power” (Volkov, 2002: 60). 
Volkov explains that thieves and bandits are 
ideal types in the criminal world and that in the 
changing social, political and economic conditions 
of the 1990s the boundaries between them and 
their ideologies were blurred. Nevertheless, he 
insists that thieves and bandits had different and 
conflicting ideologies and that “the underlying rift 
between the traditional Soviet underworld and 
the new world of violent entrepreneurs is much 
stronger that is often assumed” (Volkov, 2002: 
54). However different these two subject positions 
may be in other regards, the masculine ideologies 
of bandits and thieves do not look that dissimilar. 
Both rely on strict and straightforward masculine 
hierarchies, determine a man’s reputation on his 
ability to stand by his word and use physical and 
discursive violence, and ideologically exclude 
women from “professional” activities.2 
The paradox of the situation is that on the one hand, 
law-abiding citizens perceive prison and the criminal 
world as unambiguously negative phenomena that 
they do not want to have anything to do with.  
On the other hand, rules and norms that originated 
in prisons are widely present today in various areas 
of Russian life (Tishchenko, 2007: 5). Poniatiia 
permeate mainstream culture and the lives of 
ordinary people through a variety of cultural and 
linguistic practices, such as jargon, tattoos, gestural 
language, gang signs, underworld songs, literature, 
and other mass media productions. Oleinik’s 
research demonstrates that criminal quasi-law is 
incorporated into the activities of legal institutions 
and is widely used in various layers of contemporary 
Russian non-prison society (2001a, 2001b).
Valerii Abramkin, the Director of the Moscow 
Centre for Prison Reform, argues that the relevance 
of poniatiia in prison and in general society, can be 
explained by its proximity to the norms, values and 
attitudes of traditional Russian culture. Poniatiia 
are built on the popular (in contrast to legislative) 
understanding of justice and national culture in 
Russia. “Informal principles that we use when 
making decisions are very different from the state 
law… to solve a problem in a human way almost 
always means renouncing the law, not going to the 
courts or the police” (Utro.ru, 2007).
The popular concept of justice in Russia does  
not coincide with official law, as the Russian 
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population perceives the state as hostile.  
One of my interviewees (who had never been  
to prison) put it this way. 
  Here in Russia two different laws regulate our lives: the rule of 
thieves and the rule of democratic rights. At all times people 
consulted the thieves for justice. Thieves dealt with the core 
of a problem. There is even this notion: thieves’ laws are the 
people’s laws (kak po vorovski, tak i po liudski). They are more 
trustworthy. They are more knowledgeable about life. They 
made a decision and people really trusted it. They decided 
reasonably and competently in contrast to bold-faced 
bureaucratic pigs who have sold out for their careers.  
They are people who suffered a lot in exile in Siberia. 
Vitalii, 29 year old 
Although one can find many descriptions of prison 
life and of criminal codes of conduct, the genesis, 
evolution and dissemination of poniatiia remains 
under-researched and under-theorized. The works 
of sociologists Anton Oleinik and Vadim Volkov are 
exceptions. Drawing on the institutional analysis 
of Russian society, Oleinik shows that institutional 
structures in Russian prisons and society are 
“similar, related, and congruent” (2001b: 42),  
and argues that the reason for the dissemination  
of criminal culture in Soviet and then post-Soviet  
Russia lies in the organization of Russian society 
and the specificity of power relations (2001a, 2001b). 
Volkov’s research sheds light on the crucial role 
that criminal groups and violent entrepreneurship 
played in Russian state building after the Soviet 
Union’s collapse (2002, 2012). While the overlap 
between poniatiia and the ideology of masculinity 
is apparent, this body of scholarship nevertheless 
leaves the gendered nature of this connection 
outside the scope of analysis.
Lads’ Rules or Patsanskie pravila
  At that time, it all flourished in Russia. You go out into  
the yard and see that the yard is being ruled by poniatiia:  
here lads (patsani), there suckers (lokhi). You either become  
a lad or a sucker. 
Alexei, 28 year old
While the question of masculinity is absent from 
the works on the criminal quasi-law, in recent 
years it has attracted the attention of sociologists 
researching youth cultures and delinquent gangs 
in post-Soviet Russia (Gromov, 2013; Gromov and 
Stephenson, 2008; Kosterina, 2006; Pilkington, 
Omel’chenko and Garifzianova, 2010; Salagaev 
2001; Salagaev and Shashkin, 2002, 2003, 2005; 
Shashkin and Salagaev, 2002; Stephenson, 2009, 
2011, 2012). Most of these studies have focused on 
the cultural codes of street youth groups and the 
cultural representations and practices of Russian 
gang members (gruppirovki) involved in criminal 
activities in certain territories. All agree that the 
street groups of lads and delinquent gangs have a 
unified masculine code of honour called lads’ rules 
(patsanskie pravila), which to a certain degree rests 
on criminal quasi-law. 
Acknowledging the continuity between these two 
systems of norms and values, the literature on 
delinquent gangs in the Russian context draws a 
clear separation between poniatiia and patsanskie 
pravila, which is entirely reasonable when one looks 
at them in a broader context. That said, my research, 
which is focused on gender, stresses direct 
parallels between poniatiia and patsanskie pravila 
and even uses these honour codes as synonyms, 
for two key reasons. Firstly, the respondents do 
not distinguish between them (some use these 
terms interchangeably or say patsanskie poniatiia). 
Secondly, while differences between street and 
criminal worlds may be numerous, the shared 
attributes or at least pathways between their 
gender-related rules, attitudes and inner masculine 
hierarchies are not merely coincidental. For example, 
while explaining to me what the lad’s code of honour 
means, Vitalii directly connects the idealized image 
of a “true lad” (nastoiashchii patsan) with the image 
of a thief-in-law or vor v zakone, an established 
leader of the criminal elite who lives strictly 
according to the poniatiia and enforces them onto 
the community he is in charge of: 
  The lad won’t let you down, won’t rat on you, and won’t tell 
lies. The lad will help you. His word is as good as his bond. 
The lad is a mythological respected authority who you can 
trust. If you take all the Russian prison folklore, [the lad] has 
the same image as that of a truthful and wise thief-in-law. 
Like the criminal quasi-law, lad’s rules (patsanskie 
pravila) aim to reproduce very similar types of 
tough, aggressive, competent, sexist, but fair-
minded masculinity that relies heavily on physical 
and discursive violent practices and promotes 
a rigid hierarchy among men. This hierarchy is 
rigorously policed and regulated by entry and 
exit rituals. A complex set of punitive sanctions 
is applied to those who fail to comply with the 
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general rules (Kosterina, 2006: 23). In this sense, 
the lads’ world resembles the world of professional 
criminals, where violence is perceived as a 
social norm and a form of social communication 
(Beumers and Lipovetsky, 2009). Men with rough 
masculine bodies and tempers as well as those 
who are willing to take risks, are actively involved 
in the system of mutual supervision of each other’s 
masculinity, express strong disdain for the official 
authorities, and occupy the top positions in both 
the street and criminal worlds. In these worlds, 
the value of brotherhood and solidarity co-exists 
with intense competition between men eager to 
demonstrate their masculine vigour and bravery. 
Contemporary congruence between the norms 
and values of the poniatiia and patsanskie pravila in 
the streets can be seen to be rooted in a “series of 
systemic crises in the Soviet and post-Soviet social 
order” (Stephenson, 2011: 324), and specifically in 
the weakening of the state after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Stephenson, 2011; Salagaev, 2001; 
Salagaev & Shashkin, 2005). During the late 1980s 
and throughout the 1990s, professional criminals, 
gangs, and various semi-criminal networks 
“became important players in taking control of 
resources during the period of rapid disintegration 
of the Soviet system” (Ledeneva, 1998; Humphrey, 
2002; Nazpary, 2002 in Stephenson, 2011: 
324-325), and “agent[s] of social regulation in a 
situation when the state was weak, inefficient and 
corrupt” (Stephenson, 2011: 328). A lot of young 
and active people responded to the crisis of the 
social, economic and political order “by building 
strong neighbourhood organizations with vertical 
leadership structures and internal normative codes” 
(Stephenson, 2011: 329).
“The neighbourhood social organizations that 
became local agents of power were initially 
inclusive peer groups, companies of kids of 
different ages who spent time playing together, 
going to local dance halls and football matches, 
and defending their turf from other youngsters” 
(Stephenson, 2011: 325). In their work on the 
street gangs in Kazan’, Stephenson analyses how 
members of these local organizations became 
“the informal lords of the city quarters, instilling 
fear and awe into the local residents, capturing 
street business opportunities and even moving into 
positions of wealth and power in the larger society” 
in the 1990s (2011: 325).3
Plaksiy calculated that at the end of the 1980s 
every third male aged between 12 and 18 
was a member of a territorial group (1990: 90 
in Stephenson, 2011: 333). Some of these 
groups were only involved in group fights and 
petty delinquency, while others developed into 
professional criminal networks that used their 
violent resources for economic gain (Stephenson, 
2011: 333). Salagaev and Shashkin also note that 
from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s there was 
a massive increase in youth participation in gangs 
that were in close contact with the criminal world 
via illegal practices, and prison experiences were 
quite common among their members; in the social 
disorder of the 1990s, the acceptance of criminal 
culture gave new possibilities for social mobility 
and gender construction (Salagaev and Shashkin, 
2003). Detailed knowledge of the criminal value 
system and internalization of its normative codes 
allowed for the construction of a specific type of 
masculinity, which was hegemonic in many different 
social contexts, and, as my data shows, continues 
to be in the present day.
Another important factor in the convergence 
between poniatiia and patsanskie pravila was the 
heroisation of thieves and bandits in post-Soviet 
Russian popular media. Ratings for Radio Chanson, 
which broadcasts songs of the underworld, indicate 
that this station has been in the top five most 
popular Russian radio broadcasters for many years 
(Synovate Comcon, 2002-2007). Today, one in ten 
Muscovites listens to Radio Chanson and more than 
7.5 million people in Russia listen to it daily (WCIOM, 
2012). Films and TV series about “honourable” 
bandits, exploring the ways in which men obtain 
masculinity, power, money and respect through 
criminal means, continue to be extremely popular in 
post-Soviet Russia. Balabanov’s films Brother and 
Brother 2, where the protagonist Danila constructs 
his “respectable” masculine image by making a 
great deal of money working as a hitman for the 
Mafia, being sexually and romantically involved  
with multiple women and at the same time 
expressing “an (ironically) moralistic view that 
opposes domestic violence and theft”, honouring 
his word and protecting ‘the innocent’, are pertinent 
examples (Heller, 2011-2012: 3). Such media 
projects, along with the romanticisation of the image 
of the bandit, actively deconstruct the positive image 
of alternative legal professional groups such as the 
police and armed forces (Salagaev and Shashkin, 
2005). 
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Stephenson argues that as the economic and 
political situation in Russia has stabilized, 
incentives for joining the gangs have been 
disappearing and as the state reasserts itself, 
the gangs’ role in regulating the social order 
is becoming history (2011: 341). However, the 
hegemonic masculinity ideal that these gangs, 
along with the popular media, introduced into 
various social circles has not become a thing of 
the past. A broad awareness throughout all of the 
layers of Russian society about the criminal quasi-
law indicates that this system of norms and values 
has continued to develop. It is worth noting that 
most of the respondents I discuss in this article 
drew on the poniatiia or patsanskie pravila only 
when I asked them gender-related questions. 
These systems of meanings were also particularly 
prominent when my informants talked about 
homosexuality. The other parts of their narratives 
were almost always completely free of criminal 
jargon and norms. 
Could you explain in your own words what 
the expression “to be a man” means to 
you? 
  To be a man? I'm not sure I’ll give you a precise answer 
or any answer at all. To look at it from the street lads’ 
perspective: how do they classify the population? They are 
divided into a respected lad (avtoritetnyi patsan), gobshite 
(baklan) and faggot (pidoras). What is a respected lad?  
A lad who stands by his word (otvechaet za bazar). What is 
a gobshite? He is in general a normal lad, but he doesn’t 
stand by his word (za bazar ne otvechaet), he spouts a 
lot of crap (baklanit slishkom mnogo). A faggot also gabs 
(baklanit) too much and doesn’t stand by his word (za bazar 
ne otvechaet) and just generally is not a man, you cannot 
change or straighten him out. Here is a certain tendency,  
an archetype of a street character. This tendency helps form 
the understanding of what it is to be a man. A man–this 
is someone who stands by his word (otvechaet za bazar). 
Well this is of course a very serious matter; it is just being 
expressed in an anecdotal form here. 
Victor
Victor is a 45-year-old university professor, highly 
educated and very articulate. He has neither been 
in prison nor had serious problems with the law. 
Interviewing him was easy. As an experienced 
public speaker he was used to talking to people 
and was able to clearly and vividly formulate 
his thoughts and ideas. Narratives such as the 
one shared by Victor are very familiar to me and 
extremely common among street lads, petty 
criminals and prisoners in Russia. What made a 
mature intellectual or, for example, the eloquent, 
52-year-old businessmen, Georgii, originating 
from Soviet intelligentsia family and well-travelled 
and the well-educated 22-year-old university 
graduate, Artem, people seemingly as far from 
the criminal world as one can imagine, illustrate 
their understanding of manhood using a street 
perspective and criminal jargon? 
According to Victor and some other respondents, 
the main characteristic of a man is a non-negotiable 
commitment to stand by his word. It is difficult to 
translate the words he is using into English. The 
original concept that Victor uses, otvechat za bazar, 
is very common in the interviews with the other 
respondents who articulated their understanding of 
masculinity in criminal terms. This expression is part 
of criminal jargon, which currently has a remarkably 
widespread use in Russian culture. Bazar means 
a conversation, bazarit means to speak or talk, 
konchai bazar means “stop talking”, and est bazar 
means “we need to talk”. Today, otvechat za bazar 
expression has slipped into everyday language and 
has even become a generic designation for those 
who rely on or enact criminal culture codes. It is not 
uncommon to hear this phrase in a joking context 
when bandits and street characters are being 
mocked. However, in the prison world and the world 
of violent entrepreneurship, under certain conditions 
the price of not standing for one’s word is loss of 
safety, health, or even life. 
Otvechat za bazar principle maximizes the 
identification between words and actions. This rule 
constitutes the main pillar of criminal masculine 
ideology for very practical reasons. If a man promises 
to do something or uses threats, these threats should 
be carried out at any cost, because consistency of 
words and actions allows one to build a reputation 
and deal with certain issues without resort to force 
or coercion but simply with the means of verbal 
communication and intimidation (Volkov, 2002). 
Secondly, provided that one’s reputation in criminal 
circles is being rigorously policed and categorized, 
a single deviation from this principle would lead to 
the loss of all the symbolic and social capital that 
a man has. In other words, the functional purpose 
of the otvechat za bazar rule is to minimize physical 
and economic damage while resolving a certain 
matter and building and maintaining social hierarchies 
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between hegemonic and subordinated masculinities. 
When used by criminals themselves, the principle 
of responsibility for one’s word may be seen as 
the normative epitomy of a specific regulatory 
power regime, which determines the conversion 
of reputation into economic and social benefits 
(Volkov, 2002). However, what does loyalty to this 
principle do for non-criminals in the post-Soviet 
context? Victor, along with a number of other 
interviewees, seemed to be very invested in the rule 
of identification between words and actions. Our 
further conversation showed that for him the value  
of this principle could not possibly be overestimated:
And you know this manifests itself very strongly in my 
professional activities. Let’s say I’ve established a theorem, 
proved that I stand by my word (za bazar otvetil) and then 
let’s say some humanitarian writes some essay on Nietzsche. 
Well, what has he done? He has taken some quotations; if 
he is smart enough, he has developed a hypothesis; but he 
has not substantiated anything. Here, you see, it’s the same 
terminology. You claim something? (Ti pred’iavliaesh?) Prove 
it, lad! (Obosnui, patsan!) But he can’t prove it! And here is 
this progression. When I argued with my colleagues and 
acquaintances who are into the humanities, I gave the same 
example. Guys, I'm a respected lad (avtoritetnyi patsan), 
I stand by my word (otvechaiu za bazar), while you’re just 
gabbing (baklanite)… And maybe it was, well, I can’t say that 
this is what led me to my profession. When you start thinking 
about it, start to question yourself: Who are you? What are 
you doing? Well, maybe you're not the best person in the 
world, but at least you stand by your word. Know this and be 
at peace with yourself.
Here it can clearly be seen that Victor draws on 
the criminal ideology and street lads’ hierarchy 
for a specific purpose - to construct his own 
masculinity. Victor appropriated criminal or semi-
criminal masculine hierarchy as a resource for 
making masculinity. He did it by positioning himself 
on the top of this hierarchy and simultaneously 
constructed his colleagues in the humanties as 
subordinate. I argue that by doing so he is firstly 
relying on the cultural model, which is well familiar 
to him and to other Russian people and, secondly, 
that he is considering this model to be hegemonic 
in his socio-cultural context. Although previously 
he has denoted the street lads’ hierarchy as 
“anecdotal”, he is simultaneously very proud to 
position himself at the top of it. 
It is noteworthy that Victor, while explaining to me 
how gender double standards work, also specifically 
emphasized that the otvechat’ za bazar principle by 
definition does not apply to women and “faggots”, 
who are both in his opinion just incapable of 
“watching their tongues”. To my next question,  
what he means when he says “faggot” and if this 
term refers to homosexual men, Victor replied: 
  No, no, no, this is different… This is actually a multifaceted 
word, it does not always mean sexual orientation. It's just  
not a man. It’s fairly easy to describe this type but, again,  
on a teenage level. This is someone who’s discussing his 
street problems while having a cup of tea with his parents. 
Like there was a fight and Petya kicked his ass, Petya’s bad. 
So the parents put in a complaint to the police and Petya  
gets busted.
Victor’s example of how a man stops being a man 
and becomes a “faggot” by denouncing someone 
and seeking help from the police again refers to 
the criminal value system according to which these 
actions are considered to be a major offence. 
Later in the interview, placing a strong accent 
on the perceived costs attached to masculinity, 
Victor again aligned women’s and faggots’ social 
experience and concluded with the next formula 
of gender relations: “You’re a man, you have to. 
I’m a woman, I’m allowed to. And that is about the 
same. You're a man - you have to, I’m a faggot – 
I’m allowed to”. The very next moment he anxiously 
clarified that this is all absolutely unfamiliar to 
him and in fact he has never come into contact 
with homosexuals, whom he quite habitually 
uses the terms “fags” or “faggots”. By feminising 
homosexual men or gender-non-conforming men 
as weak, irrational, irresponsible, and unreliable, 
while simultaneously masculinising himself as 
mentally strong, rational, responsible and reliable, 
Victor engages in the making of hegemonic 
masculinity that legitimates hierarchical gender 
relations between men and women, between 
masculinity and femininity, and among men 
(Messerschmidt, 2012: 66). 
Another respondent Arsenii, a 32-year-old 
psychologist, was a part of street gang for several 
months in his late teeens, where all the youngsters 
dreamed of occupying an honourable position in 
the criminal hierarchy and, in his words, becoming 
“onlookers” (smotriashchii).4 Arsenii confirmed that 
women and girls were actively excluded from the 
criminal men’s world.
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  Those guys who started to mess with [criminality]… girls 
immediately disappeared from those companies, because 
you know this “bros before hoes” lads’ saying. Most likely, 
though, there was no place for a woman as a full participant 
in all this. She was perceived as, yes, she’s got tits, yes, it’d 
be nice to sleep with her, but nothing more than that really.
It is crucial to note that the respondents’ attitudes 
presented in this paper are not solely formed by 
the criminality discourse but are a part of the wider 
patriarchal culture which informed the socialization 
of young men in Soviet and post-Soviet societies. 
Among other things, this culture has conditioned 
and reinforced a culturally specific set of gender 
double standards, including the expulsion of 
women and girls from the public sphere. I do not 
specifically focus on the contemporary gender 
order in post-Soviet societies, the legacy of the 
Soviet version of gender equality project, or the 
recent patriarchal renaissance in Russia. All these 
questions require a detailed historical description, 
which falls outside the scope of this article. 
Nevertheless, as argued earlier, a consideration  
of the intersections between the criminal culture  
in Russia and mainstream constructions of gender 
is vital for understanding the specificity of the 
region and its gender dynamic. 
Masculinity as Homophobia in Russia
  Homophobia is a central organizing principle of our cultural 
definition of manhood. Homophobia is more than the 
irrational fear of gay men, more than the fear that we might 
be perceived as gay…Homophobia is the fear that other 
men will unmask us, emasculate us, reveal to us and the 
world that we do not measure up, that we are not real men 
(Kimmel, 1994: 127).
As Kimmel writes, the main reason for men’s 
homophobia is not the actual fear of homosexuals 
or homosexual experience but an anxiety of being 
seen as untough, uncool, and unmanly. This anxiety 
compels men and boys to express contempt for 
anyone who does not fit the culturally specific 
ideals of masculinity (Kimmel, 1994). As a number 
of researchers demonstrate, the “fag” label can 
have both sexual and nonsexual meanings that 
nevertheless always draw on notions of gender 
(Pascoe, 2007: 22). For instance, Pascoe’s research 
on “fag discourse” in a working class high school 
in California shows that “a fag has as much to do 
with failing at masculine tasks of competence, 
heterosexual prowess, and strength or in any way 
revealing weakness or femininity as it does with  
a sexual identity” (Pascoe, 2007: 54). 
These insights and conclusions of Western 
scholars may be applied to a variety of different 
cultures, including Russian culture, and to some 
extent have been confirmed by my research data 
(as Victor’s case demonstrates). However, the fag 
discourse in a country where homosexuality was 
criminalized5 for most of the twentieth century and 
marked as anti-social behaviour6 lacks the fluidity 
and ambiguity between sexual and nonsexual 
meanings that contemporary American researchers 
have observed and documented. 
During my interviews, I came across many 
instances where men drew direct parallels between 
the fag discourse and prison attitudes towards 
homosexuality. Here is how Vitalii, a 29-year-old 
photographer, describes contemporary attitudes to 
“fags” in Russia.
  Fags? For me it's just surreal. I don’t know them ... from 
childhood for us to be called a faggot or something has 
been like the main insult. And in general it was very much 
punished. In modern Russia, after the 90s there is still this 
terrible cloud of prison abuse (opuskanie). One becomes 
humiliated. And this still exists. Now we’re kind of being 
instilled with tolerance and everybody blames Russia that 
we’re all too laddish here. But Russia is still like that; it is not 
ready to see guys kissing each other. You can still get your 
teeth kicked in for that. Many people do not realize that it’s 
better to keep fags [in the closet]. This way they will be safer. 
If they reveal themselves now, every other [man] will punch 
them in the face. There could be a special day, like the 
Airborne Forces day when they beat up the churki7; here it 
could be a day when they beat up the fags. It's just crazy 
and incomprehensible. It’s not normal. People are men and 
women. Full stop. I will not kill them, but I don’t want to have 
anything to do with them. Although there are a lot of them,  
so we might work alongside them and not even know it.
Vitaly not only describes the word “fag” as a 
harsh insult to a man but states that for him it is 
associated with the prison practice of opuskanie, 
which means converting somebody by force 
into a passive homosexual or, in prison terms, a 
“rooster”. In the prison world, “fags” constitute 
a separate lowest caste, the lowest of all, more 
habitually called petukhi - roosters, “the lowly” 
– opushchennye, or pederasty - the pederasts. 
It is the caste of pariahs. Even casually touching 
a rooster or his possessions (like a spoon or a 
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towel) can result in the “contamination” of the 
unwary inmate and his subsequent descent into 
a lower caste. The roosters are separated from 
the other prisoners, physically as well as socially. 
In the prison setting, actual or symbolic rape8 is a 
punishment for serious offences such as stealing 
from or denouncing inmates, or refusing to pay 
gambling debts. Once converted there is no way 
back; a rooster becomes the target of extreme  
daily violence for the rest of his time in prison.  
For this reason, inmates consider murder to be 
more humane than opuskanie (Oleinik, 2003). 
In spite of the fact that Vitalii has never been 
to jail and imagines himself to be a progressive 
representative of his generation who understands 
the concept of tolerance and holds negative but 
non-violent attitudes towards homosexual people, 
his homophobic sentiments are unambiguously 
informed by prison norms, which he also sees as 
valid for the rest of the Russian population. In other 
words, the hegemonic masculine discourse that 
came into being in prison has not just shaped Vitalii’s 
understanding that a gay man can not be considered 
a man. It has also instructed him that a real man (a 
status that hegemonic masculinity promises) must 
not have anything to do with homosexuals.
The influence of prison culture on homophobic 
attitudes and ideas about masculinity is also visible 
in the narratives of the other respondents. Dmitrii, 
a 26-year-old sales promoter in advertising, did 
not use any criminal jargon or system of norms 
throughout the interview. It was only when I probed 
his views on the boundaries of masculinity and 
asked whether, in his opinion, a gay man could be 
a man, that he suddenly drew on prison discourse 
and answered that “an active one probably can”. 
Then he added that a passive one most probably 
could not. 
Anatolii, a 32-year-old auditor, whose case will be 
discussed in the following section of this article, 
also drew on prison discourse when talking about 
homosexuality:
  M: If you were given a chance to be born in a female body, 
would you use it?
  A: No, indeed, because I see this idea as connected 
with some kind of sexual deviation. I don’t know, there is 
something disgusting in it for me. Well, if you want it,  
go to a gay club, say that you are passive, and experience 
what it feels like when somebody fucks you.
Dmitrii and Anatolii associate the notion of “being 
a man” and being in a male body with taking an 
“active” part in a sexual encounter. Therefore it 
is not a homosexual act that is considered to be 
emasculating per se, but rather the abandonment 
of an active masculine role, and the rejection of 
sexual dominance. This aspect distinguishes 
the prison understanding of homosexuality 
and homophobia from mainstream religious 
homophobia, which does not differentiate between 
active and passive "sodomites" (Volodarskii, 2013: 
175). These respondents’ views correspond with 
the strict prison rules where the ban on touching 
“roosters” does not apply to having sex with them. 
The most respected inmates who belong to the 
top of the illicit hierarchy can have their own lovers 
from the caste of “roosters”. Provided that they 
always perform the “active” sex part, it does not 
affect their superior status. 
Discussion of homophobia and homosexuality  
in Russia is a complicated and multilayered task. 
The investigation of the roots of contemporary 
homophobia in this country is beyond the scope  
of this article. Nevertheless I should note that in the 
narratives of my respondents the discourse on fags 
and homosexuality was very often informed by, and 
imbued with, the atrocities of prison, where a fag 
identity is a lifelong sentence resulting in isolation, 
violence, loss and humiliation. More research needs 
to be done in this area in order to understand how 
to address homophobia in Russia. One of the 
starting points of this research could be to consider 
whether the post-Soviet Russian government’s 
reluctance not only to fight homophobia but even 
to talk about it has made prison tales and codes 
the main source of information about homosexual 
practices and identities that frames Russian 
people’s attitudes.
Compulsory Criminality 
Not all of the respondents who drew on the 
discourses of criminality when they talked about 
masculinity did so in the same way. While Alexei, 
Victor and Vitalii celebrated the criminal culture’s 
values and norms and strove to construct their 
own masculinity in accordance with them, some 
of the interviewees spontaneously distinguished 
themselves from “this kind of man”. Anatolii’s story 
is illustrative in this sense.
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  I remember that my father wanted to make some kind of a 
sportsman out of me – well, not a sportsman exactly, but a 
fighter. So [he said] you need to do sports, boxing, wrestling, 
all this crap. From his words, it seemed that the world only 
consists of fighting without rules. At that time he had to do a 
lot of business with bandits, communicate with them. Well, 
it was not his business, he just worked in a big company ... 
He told me: "Yes of course, you are a smart boy, but you’d 
better go in for sports". Well, anyway I remember that it all 
turned my stomach. How can I put it? This machismo a la 
90s, when thugs are all around and one needs to be able 
to repel them and stand for his word… Plus, at this time 
my uncle, who happened to get put in jail in the Andropov 
years for a fight in a pub, was still alive. And when he got 
out of prison he began to tell us his stories about prison life 
using jargon. I don’t remember anything good [about him], 
though he was sort of a normal person, but all this thieves’ 
talk, all these existential maxims of prison life. How terrible! 
I am sick of it! I myself can use it with a lot of irony. I clearly 
remember when I was 14-15 years old and my father told 
me about "bazar" and all this stuff ... That said, he was a 
person with two degrees. Well, as the saying goes, social 
settings shape you. In the 2000s, when this banditry had 
blown over, he, in my opinion, very seriously rethought his 
so-called values. Now of course he sees it all as a terrible 
time in his life. 
Anatolii’s relationship with criminal poniatiia is very 
different from those of the other men whose stories I 
include in this article. Firstly, he ridicules and disagrees 
with the criminal type of masculine bravado, and 
secondly, unlike Alexei, Victor, Arsenii and Vitallii,  
who all admitted that they engaged with the criminal 
value system on the streets, Anatolii had encountered 
it not only among his peers but also at home:  
“For Christ’s sake, my school was full of gopniks,9 
and then you come home and your father tells you 
the same things”. In his words, he experienced 
considerable pressure from his family members  
to internalize criminal and prison norms in order to 
build an adequate masculine identity. His father was 
a key figure in applying this pressure on him. 
The main reason why Anatolii’s father wanted to 
equip his son with knowledge of the poniatiia and 
encourage him to become a skilled fighter was 
to prepare him for “real life”. In the morass of the 
1990s, the period that Anatoly refers to, “real life” in 
Russia and particularly life around the processes of 
building a market economy was to a considerable 
degree controlled by the organized crime networks. 
For almost a decade following the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, the usual dichotomy 
between legal and illegal was no longer in place. 
The new state economic sector existed in a legal 
and regulatory vacuum, with state institutions being 
weak or corrupt. At this time, violent entrepreneurs 
of different levels (organized crime groups, private 
protection companies, informal units of state police 
acting as private actors) started to play a crucial 
role in creating the institutions of a new market  
and the processes of social regulation (Stephenson, 
2012; Volkov, 2002). According to Anatolii’s 
testimony, his father had to do a lot of business 
with these violent entrepreneurs. 
One of the main skills required for carrying out 
violent entrepreneurship is the competent use 
and demonstration of physical force. Strong, well-
trained bodies and fighting skills were considered 
a prerequisite for the process of control and 
establishing order. In the 1990s, physical force 
could be transformed into economic benefits 
and was one of the main methods of confirming 
masculinity. Men who could not rebuff physical 
and “conversational”s violence (the term of Collins, 
2008) directed at them became victims because 
they did not embody hegemonic masculinity and 
thus were not considered “real men” (Salagaev and 
Shashkin, 2003). Relying on the principle that “might 
is right”, a man could use his fighting skills to claim 
social and even moral superiority (Volkov, 2002). 
Another important skill that Anatolii’s father and 
uncle wanted him to acquire was fluency in criminal 
norms and values. They assumed that in presenting 
oneself as a bearer of such norms, a man in post-
Soviet Russia identifies with the strong dominant 
group in the street, criminal, and business spaces, 
and thus obtains a solid reputation and individual 
power (Salagaev and Shashkin, 2003). In other 
words, the adequate masculinity that Anatolii was 
pressured to learn comprised a high level of physical 
strength, an active position in life, aggression, and 
determined use of violence. Within the confines of 
his family settings, a powerful and straightforward 
criminality discourse emphasised tough, hegemonic 
masculinity that he felt obliged to reproduce.
In his narrative, Anatolii constructs criminal culture 
norms and discourses as ugly, aggressive and 
pathological manifestations of a lack of cultural 
and educational competency. For him, this 
characterized the 1990s in Russia. It is nevertheless 
curious that while Anatoly connects the existence 
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of criminal masculinities with a particular historical 
period, which according to him ceased to exist in 
the 2000s, he still pays considerable attention to 
reasoning about the criminal world and repeatedly 
stresses that he is not like “this kind of man”. One 
of the reasons why this topic is so important to 
him is his involuntary sense of familial belonging to 
this culture. However Anatolii’s story of deprivation 
of the freedom of choice whether to internalise 
or reject criminal masculinity accords with the 
stories of other respondents, who in different ways 
implied that the criminality discourse had been 
compulsory for them, had a disciplinary character 
and in general characterised the daily relations of 
authority and submission in various social settings. 
These findings are supported by the conclusions of 
Beumers and Lipovetsky who state that during the 
1990s in Russia discursive violence, “in particular 
that of a criminal culture… rapidly subordinated 
the field of social and economic communication… 
[while] the virtuosos of ‘popular’ communication 
by means of violence, and those who assimilated 
these languages, formed the new elites” (2009: 63). 
Discussion and Conclusion
This article examines the links between discourses 
of masculinity and criminality in the narratives of 
law-abiding Russian men who have never had 
direct contact with detention facilities. The analysis 
confirms the conclusions of criminologists and 
sociologists researching prison, criminal and 
street cultures in Russia that criminal quasi-law 
is being widely used amongst various layers of 
contemporary Russian non-prison society and 
reveals that rigid criminal masculine hierarchies 
defined by this law are widely-known and well-
recognised. Post-Soviet Russian masculinities 
are in a state of complex power relations with 
criminal values and hierarchies. Reliance on the 
criminal hierarchies in the Russian context offers an 
opportunity to men, both criminal and non-criminal, 
to construct a hegemonic masculinity – a specific 
type of masculinity that structures and legitimates 
gender inequality and hierarchies between men 
and between men and women (Connell and 
Messerschmidt, 2005). 
By looking at the interplay between masculinity and 
criminality in the narratives of law-abiding Russian 
men, this study contributes to criminological 
research and masculinities studies in three 
ways. Firstly, addressing the question of why it 
is particularly in the formation of masculinity that 
poniatiia and patsanskie pravila are important even 
to men who are not actually steeped in this culture, 
my research contributes to the understanding of 
post-Soviet masculinities and outlines important 
and unresearched areas for further investigation. 
Secondly, my research not only helps to fill the  
gap in empirical studies on both gender order in 
post-Soviet Russia and criminal and street cultures, 
but puts these two fields of study in a conversation 
with each other. Thirdly and most importantly,  
by looking at criminological literature via a gender 
sensitive lens, this study demonstrates that gender 
blind approach to criminal culture in Russia is 
unable to explain the patterns of dissemination  
of poniatiia among Russian population. 
Soviet and post-Soviet Russia was and remains 
a society with a high level of incarceration, where 
imprisonment is almost the only type of criminal 
punishment. Although the prison population was 
much higher in the USSR,10 today Russia still has 
one of the highest incarceration rates (475 per 
100,000 of national population) and the third largest 
prison population (0.68 million) in the world (ICPS, 
2013). According to a recent all-Russian public 
opinion poll of the Levada Center, a total of 17 
percent of respondents have either been in prison 
or have ex-convicts amongst their close relatives. 
The same poll shows that a total of 46 percent 
of respondents have “a general idea about the 
criminal quasi-law”, 38 percent are “well familiar 
with the criminal quasi-law”, 5 percent “try to follow 
criminal quasi-law”, 2 percent “live according to 
the criminal quasi-law” (Levada Center, 2013). 
This public poll shows that prison culture is highly 
influential in Russia. However, I argue that simple 
statistical explanation can only serve us as a 
starting point of an explanation.
It is important to make clear that when we talk 
about prison and criminal culture permeating broad 
sections of the Russian population, we are talking 
about male prison culture. Women’s prisons, first, 
are much fewer in number (they constitute only 
about 8 percent of the overall prison population).11 
Second, and more importantly, they function 
quite differently. In contrast to men’s colonies, the 
women's prison communities do not have strict 
vertical hierarchy based on criminal biographies 
of prisoners and castes of prisoners. Women 
prisoners in Russia tend to build horizontal social 
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relationships and, in contrast to male prisoners, 
do not organize an active co-resistance to the 
prison administration (Al’pern, 2004, Tishchenko, 
2007, Piacentini, 2004, Pallot and Piacentini, 2012, 
Omel’chenko, 2012). 
It turns out that the heavily masculinized prison or 
criminal quasi-law with its cult of strong character, 
risk, action, romantic brotherhood of outlaws, 
rigid hierarchies, specific type of homophobia, 
objectification of women and depicting them 
as inherently different and unequal (not proper 
human beings) may define not only other criminals’ 
and street lads’ ideas about masculinity but 
spread much further into the broader ideology 
of masculinity in post-Soviet Russia. The fact 
that almost half of the research participants 
spontaneously addressed the rules of the criminal 
world when talking about gender and sexuality 
in order to articulate their understanding of 
masculinity, both refutes the popular opinion that 
the criminality of the 1990s has become history 
and indicates that existing criminological research 
overlooks something very important. 
Institutional analysis that explains the infiltration of 
prison subculture into various spheres of everyday 
lives by the similarity between the institutional 
structures of the prison community and Russian 
society in general (Oleinik, 2001: 42) is not 
enough to address such a complex phenomenon. 
Institutional analysis is unable to explain why 
individual people with very diverse backgrounds 
chose or chose not to engage in criminality 
discourse. After all, what does it actually mean 
for a non-criminal man to perform a criminality 
discourse? In closing, let me turn to Judith Butler, 
a renowned philosopher and gender theorist, who 
posed one very important question: “…the question 
of whether or not a position is right, coherent, or 
interesting… is less informative than why it is we 
come to occupy and defend the territory that we 
do, what it promises us, from what it promises to 
protect us” (Butler, 1994: 127-128). Rephrasing 
Butler, what does acceptance and internalization 
of the criminal culture’s hierarches and values give 
Russian men and what does it protect them from? 
My answer is hegemonic masculinity. 
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Notes
1 Examples of these hierarchies may be prison castes (“blatnye” 
or “thieves”, “muzhiki” or “blokes”, “kozly” or “goats”, “petukhi” 
or “fags”) or well know criminal and street hierarchies that 
derived from my data: 1) “brodiaga” (vagabond) and “kommers” 
(businessmen); 2) “avtoritetnyi patsan” (respected lad), “baklan” 
(gobshite) and “pidaras” (faggot); 3) “Patsan” (lad), “banchila” 
(fence or pusher) and “bliad” (wench or hooker); 4) “Patsan” (lad) 
and “lokh” (sucker).
2 The ideological exclusion of women does not mean that they 
were actually excluded from all collaborative illegal activities.
3 By the end of 1980s -1990s, Kazan type street gangs were 
ubiquitous in many Russian cities, such as Ulan-Ude, Ioshkar-
Ola, Ul’ianovsk, Naberezhnye Chelny, Cheliabinsk, Petrozavodsk 
and in the suburbs of Moscow and St. Petersburg (Stephenson, 
2011: 342).
4 A smotriashchii is a person who is looking after compliance 
with the criminal quasi-law in a prison cell or enforces this law 
onto a certain territorial community at liberty, which he is in 
charge of. A smotriashchii is personally appointed by a thief-in-
law, has many special rights, authority, and enjoys a very high 
status in the criminal hierarchy. 
5 In the early 1930s Stalin’s regime instituted infamous “Article 
121”, according to which men could be sentenced for up to 5 
years for homosexual relations (Chalidze, 1977; Kon, 1997).
6 “Soviet attitudes [towards homosexuality] began to change 
only after 1987, with the beginning of perestrojka and 
the decriminalization of homosexuality in the mid-1990s” 
(Kuntsman, 2003: 302).
7 Churki is a derogatory Russian term for migrants from North 
Caucasus, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. 
8 An example of symbolic rape could be touching a sleeping 
person’s lips with a towel with sperm on it. The consequences of 
symbolic rape for a victim’s status in prison are indistinguishable 
from those of actual rape.
9 Gopnik is a derogatory term for “street” young people.  
They are seen as violently colonising the city space and being 
involved in turf fights, attacks on young people who are not 
members of their local groups, small-scale delinquency,  
and crime (Stephenson, 2012: 69).
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10 Incarceration rates in the USSR differed by year. For example, 
780 per 100,000 people were incarcerated in 1936; 1500 in 
1941; 2700 in 1953; and 847 in 1986 (Luneev, 2006).
11 According to the official website of Federal Penal Service, 
the overall number of prisoners in Russia as of 01.04.2014 is 
674900, of which women make up 55,300 (FPS, 2014).
12 In their work on women’s carceral experience in Russia, Pallot 
and Piacentini aim to challenge “the comfortable and comforting 
picture of compliant women in Russian colonies,” and claim that 
patterns of domination and subordination in these colonies do 
exist and that social relationships between women-prisoners 
are “complex and layered” (2012: 198-199). Nevertheless, the 
authors confirm that social hierarchies in women’s and men’s 
prisons in Russia can not be evaluated using the same criteria. 
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